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NOTE
The Eighth Circuit Further Complicates
Plaintiff Standing in Data Breach Cases
In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763 (8th Cir. 2017)
Kuhns v. Scottrade, Inc., 868 F.3d 711 (8th Cir. 2017)
Aaron Wynhausen *

I. INTRODUCTION
Mass data breaches are a symptom of the digital era and occur with increasing frequency. In the past decade, nearly every sector of the economy has
experienced a major breach of personal data, including finance, healthcare, retail, government, hospitality, media, and technology. 1 Breaches affect consumer data, government agencies, voting rolls, healthcare providers, scientific
data, business records and trade secrets, attorney work-product, and nearly everything else digital. 2 Fiascos surrounding poor data stewardship at companies,
like Facebook and Equifax, are frequently featured in national media. 3
As large data caches containing sensitive personally identifiable information continue to expand, the chances for a breach grow in kind. The potential harm from a breach varies depending on the type of data compromised.
Breaches of the most sensitive data, such as social security numbers, embarrassing personal information, medical information, and bank account information, can lead to mass disruptions in people’s lives. Breaches of less sensitive data, such as credit card information, online account login credentials,
email addresses, home addresses, and phone numbers have less potential for

* J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of Law, 2019. Thank you to Courtney
Lock, Lauren Vincent, David Rogers, Connor Smith, and Professor Dennis Crouch for
their edits and comments to this Note.
1. See, e.g., BAKERHOSTETLER, IS YOUR ORGANIZATION COMPROMISE READY?:
2016 DATA SECURITY INCIDENT RESPONSE REPORT 1–2 (2016), https://www.bakerlaw.com/files/uploads/Documents/Privacy/2016-Data-Security-Incident-ResponseReport.pdf.
2. See, e.g., id. at 2.
3. See, e.g., Mike Isaac & Sheera Frenkel, Facebook Security Breach Exposes
Accounts of 50 Million Users, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/28/technology/facebook-hack-data-breach.html; Brian Fung,
Equifax’s Massive 2017 Data Breach Keeps Getting Worse, WASH. POST (Mar. 1,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2018/03/01/equifaxkeeps-finding-millions-more-people-who-were-affected-by-its-massive-data-breach/.
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direct harm but can have frustrating consequences for those whose data is compromised. No uniform federal law exists governing the legal duties of those
who collect and store personally identifiable information (“PII”), and when a
breach occurs, the difficulty in identifying actual harm or quantifying a remedy
makes the appropriate legal response unclear.
In 2016, reported data breaches increased to a record 1,093 incidents –
exposing over thirty-six million identified records. 4 Some estimates suggest
that between eighty to ninety percent of Fortune 500 companies and government agencies have experienced a data security breach. 5 The proliferation of
data breaches led one federal judge to note that “[t]here are only two types of
companies left in the United States[] according to data security experts: ‘those
that have been hacked and those that don’t know they’ve been hacked.’” 6 Influential digital security expert Brian Krebs summed up the phenomenon in a
blog post identifying the “immutable truths” about data breaches:
There are some fairly simple, immutable truths that each of us should
keep in mind, truths that apply equally to political parties, organizations
and corporations alike: [(1)] If you connect to the Internet, someone will
try to hack it. [(2)] If what you put on the Internet has value, someone
will invest time and effort to steal it. [(3)] Even if what is stolen does
not have immediate value to the thief, he can easily find buyers for it.
[(4)] The price he secures for it will almost certainly be a tiny slice of
its true worth to the victim. [(5)] Organizations and individuals unwilling to spend a small fraction of what those assets are worth to secure
them against cybercrooks can expect to eventually be relieved of said
assets. 7

Plaintiffs have brought hundreds of class action lawsuits against organizations that were responsible for maintaining customer PII and subsequently
suffered a breach. 8 While data breach cases have been litigated in nearly every

4. IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR., DATA BREACH REPORTS: 2016 END OF YEAR
REPORT 4 (2017), http://www.idtheftcenter.org/images/breach/2016/DataBreachReport_2016.pdf.
5. Miles L. Galbraith, Comment, Identity Crisis: Seeking a Unified Approach to
Plaintiff Standing for Data Security Breaches of Sensitive Personal Information, 62
AM. U. L. REV. 1365, 1368 (2013).
6. Storm v. Paytime, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 3d 359, 360 (M.D. Pa. 2015) (quoting
Nicole Perlroth, The Year in Hacking, by the Numbers, N.Y. TIMES: BITS (Apr. 22,
2013, 9:10 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/22/the-year-in-hacking-by-thenumbers/).
7. Brian Krebs, Krebs’s Immutable Truths About Data Breaches, KREBS ON
SECURITY (Jan. 9, 2017), https://krebsonsecurity.com/2017/01/krebss-immutabletruths-about-data-breaches/.
8. See, e.g., Hayley Tsukayama, Equifax Faces Hundreds of Class-Action Lawsuits and an SEC Subpoena over the Way It Handled Its Data Breach, WASH. POST
(Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
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federal circuit court, each circuit has treated them differently with respect to
standing and whether a claim for damages exists. 9 Most of these cases are
appealed on standing issues. 10 This Note examines two recent cases from the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and analyzes how these decisions
fit into the greater scheme of data breach litigation in the United States today.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This Note examines two cases from the Eighth Circuit, both dealing with
the same general issue – an unauthorized breach of consumer data. Each class
action was consolidated to a district court within the Eighth Circuit, dismissed
for lack of standing, and appealed by the plaintiffs to separate panels. 11 The
appellate decisions were released just nine days apart. 12 The type of breach
was unique in each case, and the plaintiffs claimed different types of injuries,
but the legal issue on appeal remained the same – did the plaintiffs sufficiently
allege an injury in fact for purposes of establishing Article III standing? This
Part summarizes the facts and provides a brief procedural history of each case.

A. Kuhns v. Scottrade, Inc.: Decided August 21, 2017 13
The first of the two cases decided by the Eighth Circuit involved hackers
accessing the customer database of Scottrade, a securities brokerage firm headquartered in St. Louis, Missouri. 14 Between September 2013 and February
2014, the hackers acquired PII of over 4.6 million customers. 15 The hackers
then used this data to operate a stock manipulation scheme, a dozen illegal internet gambling websites, and even a Bitcoin exchange. 16 Scottrade was unaware of the breach until August 2015, when the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(“FBI”) notified Scottrade that the breach had occurred. 17 Scottrade began notifying affected customers through email and mail on October 2, 2015, and
suggested customers be “vigilant” for signs of fraud for the next two years. 18
Scottrade then arranged to have customers receive one year of “identity repair
switch/wp/2017/11/09/equifax-faces-hundreds-of-class-action-lawsuits-and-an-secsubpoena-over-the-way-it-handled-its-data-breach/.
9. See discussion infra Part III.
10. See discussion infra Section III.A.
11. See In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763, 765 (8th Cir. 2017); Kuhns v. Scottrade, Inc., 868 F.3d 711, 714 (8th Cir. 2017).
12. See In re SuperValu, 870 F.3d at 763; Kuhns, 868 F.3d at 711.
13. 868 F.3d at 711.
14. Id. at 713.
15. Id. at 713–14.
16. Id. at 714.
17. Id. at 715.
18. Id.; Duqum v. Scottrade, Inc., No. 4:15-CV-1537-SPM, 2016 WL 3683001, at
*1 (E.D. Mo. July 12, 2016), aff’d sub nom. Kuhns v. Scottrade, Inc., 868 F.3d 711 (8th
Cir. 2017).
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and protection services ‘with no enrollment required’” and offered one year of
free credit monitoring and identity theft insurance. 19
When customers signed up for an account with Scottrade, they provided
PII in the form of names, addresses, social security numbers, tax identification
numbers, telephone numbers, email addresses, employer information, and
work history. 20 A “Privacy Policy and Security Statement” was included in
the agreement made with customers. 21 In the Privacy Policy, Scottrade
claimed that it would “maintain physical, electronic and procedural safeguards
. . . to guard . . . nonpublic personal information” and that it “offer[ed] a secure
server and password-protected environment . . . protected by . . . encryption.” 22
Scottrade also made two separate representations online that contained similar
language. 23
After the announcement of the breach, several customers (“Plaintiffs,”
collectively) filed four separate punitive class action complaints in three federal
district courts. 24 The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri
consolidated the actions into its jurisdiction. 25 The four named Plaintiffs filed
a consolidated class action seeking a certification of the class, damages for ten
causes of action, 26 injunctive relief, and attorneys’ fees and costs. 27 The district court refused to consider the merits of the case and dismissed the case
without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 28 The court dismissed
because Plaintiffs failed to allege sufficient injuries to satisfy Article III standing requirements. 29 Only one named Plaintiff, Matthew Kuhns, appealed; and
the main question on appeal was whether his claimed injuries were sufficient
to satisfy Article III standing. 30 Scottrade cross-appealed, claiming that even
if Kuhns had standing, he had not pleaded sufficient facts for which relief could
be granted. 31

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Kuhns, 868 F.3d at 715.
Id. at 714.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Duqum v. Scottrade, Inc., No. 4:15-CV-1537-SPM, 2016 WL 3683001, at *1
(E.D. Mo. July 12, 2016), aff’d sub nom. Kuhns v. Scottrade, Inc., 868 F.3d 711 (8th
Cir. 2017).
25. Id.
26. Those causes of action included: breach of contract, breach of implied contract, negligence, unjust enrichment, declaratory relief, and violations of multiple state
statutes. Id. at *2.
27. Consolidated Class Action Complaint at 2, Duqum, 2016 WL 3683001, (No
4:11-cv-01537-SPM), 2016 WL 8459371.
28. Duqum, 2016 WL 3683001, at *8.
29. Id.
30. Kuhns, 868 F.3d at 715.
31. Id. at 714.
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Kuhns argued that “Scottrade provided deficient cybersecurity in violation of its ‘contractual and other obligations.’” 32 He claimed that because of
that deficiency, he “faced an immediate and continuing increased risk of identity theft,” incurred costs from monitoring personal accounts to mitigate risk of
fraud, received diminished value of services from Scottrade, overpaid for diminished services, suffered a decline in value of his PII, and suffered an invasion of privacy. 33
Scottrade argued that Kuhns failed to establish “‘concrete facts’ sufficient
to plausibly suggest a certainly impending risk of future identity theft” resulting from the hack. 34 Regarding the “diminished value” claim, Scottrade argued
that the fees paid were to execute stock trades – which were faithfully executed
– and therefore there was no breach of contract and Kuhns received the full
“benefit of the bargain.” 35 Scottrade further argued that even if the Eighth Circuit were to find standing, it should dismiss the case for failure to state a claim
for which relief could be granted because no actual monetary damages could
be identified. 36
The Eighth Circuit held that Kuhns had standing based on his contract
claims, reasoning that customers “did not receive the full benefit of [the] bargain” and “received brokerage services of [a] lesser value” when their PII was
compromised. 37 The Eighth Circuit found that Scottrade breached the contract
by failing to provide “promised reasonable safeguards” contained within a privacy policy, which, in turn, caused Kuhns to suffer injury in fact sufficient to
confer standing. 38 However, the court affirmed the dismissal with prejudice
because Kuhns failed to plausibly allege “actual damages” in the breach of
contract. 39

B. In re SuperValu, Inc.: Decided August 30, 2017 40
The second of the two cases decided by the Eighth Circuit involved the
theft of customer financial information from major grocery store chains after
hackers installed malicious software on point-of-sale devices in over 1,000
stores. 41 From June 22, 2014, to July 17, 2014, hackers gained access to the
computer network that SuperValu used to process credit and debit card transactions. 42 The hackers installed software on that network, which allowed them
32. Id. at 715.
33. Id.
34. Defendant/Appellee/Cross-Appellant Scottrade, Inc.’s Principal and Response

Brief at 31, Kuhns, 868 F.3d 711, (Nos. 16-3426, 16-3542), 2016 WL 6831141.
35. Id. at 34–35.
36. Id. at 14–15.
37. Kuhns, 868 F.3d at 716.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 714, 718.
40. 870 F.3d 763 (8th Cir. 2017).
41. Id. at 766.
42. Id.
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to “harvest” customer payment information as it crossed the network. 43 This
information included customer names, payment card account numbers, 44 expiration dates, card verification codes, and personal identification numbers. 45
This type of information is considered PII, and the “harvesting” of that data is
considered theft. 46
On August 14, 2014, nearly two months after the incident began, SuperValu issued a press release notifying customers of the breach and admitting
that a theft of the data had potentially occurred. 47 On September 29, 2014,
SuperValu announced that a second data breach had occurred after the August
2014 press release and that a different malicious software had been installed
on the same network. 48 In both announcements, SuperValu acknowledged the
presence of hostile software on the payment network but downplayed the notion that any data “was in fact stolen” and pledged to investigate the intrusion’s
scope. 49
Sixteen customers (“Plaintiffs,” collectively), representing a class who
had purchased goods from SuperValu stores over a four-month period using a
credit or debit card, filed four separate class actions in federal district courts in
three states against three corporations that owned and operated thousands of
SuperValu retail grocery stores across the country (“Defendants,” collectively). 50 Defendants moved to centralize the proceedings, and the United
States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation ordered the cases consolidated
as a single class action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota. 51
In the amended consolidated class action complaint, Plaintiffs sought certification of the class, money damages based upon six causes of action, 52 injunctive

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.
This includes data from both credit and debit cards. Id.
Id.
Id. at 769.
Id. at 766.
Id.
Id.
In re SuperValu, Inc., No. 14-MD-2586 ADM/TNL, 2016 WL 81792, at *1–
2 (D. Minn. Jan. 7, 2016), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded 870 F.3d 763 (8th
Cir. 2017). The defendants included: SuperValu Inc., a Fortune 100 corporation headquartered in Minnesota and third-largest food retailer in the United States with over
3,000 stores; AB Acquisitions, LLC, a privately held company headquartered in Idaho
that owned and operated over 1,000 stores; and New Albertson’s, Inc., a wholly-owned
subsidiary of AB Acquisitions, LLC. Consolidated Class Action Complaint at 11–12,
In re SuperValu, No. 14-MD-2586 ADM/TNL, 2016 WL 81792.
51. See In re SuperValu, 870 F.3d at 765.
52. Those causes of action included: “(1) violations of state consumer protection
statutes, (2) violations of state data breach notification statutes, (3) negligence, (4)
breach of implied contract, (5) negligence per se, and (6) unjust enrichment.” Id. at
767.
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relief, 53 and attorneys’ fees and costs. 54 Like Kuhns, the district court refused
to reach the merits of the case and, upon a motion from Defendants, dismissed
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 55 for a “failure to allege facts establishing
Article III standing.” 56 Thus, the primary question on appeal was whether the
court could find Article III standing based on a substantial and imminent risk
of harm to customers who had personal data compromised by the data breach. 57
Plaintiffs’ argued that Defendants “failed to take adequate measures to
protect customers’ Card Information.” 58 Plaintiffs first alleged that the data
breach occurred because Defendants used substandard data security practices 59
that violated industry best practices and heightened the likelihood of a breach. 60
Plaintiffs additionally alleged that because numerous large data breaches had
occurred targeting retailers, Defendants should have foreseen the vulnerability
in their security systems and been prepared for an attack. 61 Plaintiffs claimed
that because of Defendants’ substandard practices and lack of foresight, they
were subjected “to an imminent and real possibility of identity theft” for an
“extended period of time” because of the long-term vulnerability of financial
information on the digital black market. 62 One named Plaintiff, David Holmes,
also claimed that a fraudulent charge appeared on his credit card shortly after
Defendants’ first breach announcement, and in response, he cancelled the card
and waited two weeks for a replacement. 63 Defendants responded that Plaintiffs failed to allege that they suffered any actual or impending injuries, that
any future injuries were “merely speculative,” and that any costs incurred by
Plaintiffs in protecting against a speculative injury were self-imposed harms. 64
A unanimous three-judge panel for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district
ruling in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case to the district court for
53. The injunctive relief sought to enjoin Defendants from continuing the claimed
“unlawful practices.” Consolidated Class Action Complaint, supra note 50, at 40. It
also asked the court to order the defendants to identify all victims and pay damages and
order Defendants to begin corrective advertising campaigns. Id.
54. Id.
55. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1).
56. See In re SuperValu, Inc., No. 14-MD-2586 ADM/TNL, 2016 WL 81792, at
*3 (D. Minn. Jan. 7, 2016), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded 870 F.3d 763 (8th
Cir. 2017).
57. In re SuperValu, 870 F.3d at 768.
58. Id. at 766.
59. Such as easily guessed passwords, failure to lock out users after multiple failed
login attempts, and no segregation of the network by use of firewalls. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 766–67. The specific threat was that the hackers could use the compromised data to make charges or withdrawals, open new credit accounts, or sell the data
to third parties who could do the same. Id.
63. Id. at 767.
64. Brief of Defendants-Appellees at 29–32, In re SuperValu, 870 F.3d 763 (Nos.
16-2378, 16-2528).
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further proceedings. 65 The Eighth Circuit held that there were insufficient
claims in the complaint to allege “substantial risk of future identity theft” but
held that only Holmes, who had claimed a present injury for the fraudulent
charge on his card, had standing. 66 The court noted that a putative class action
could proceed as long as one named Plaintiff could show standing and concluded that the district court erred in dismissing the action for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. 67 The court then affirmed the dismissal for the fifteen other
Plaintiffs and remanded the case to the district court to consider the merits of
the Holmes’ claim. 68

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Legal solutions for data breaches currently fall into two main categories
– Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) enforcement actions 69 and private suits
based in tort, contract, or state statute. 70 Typically, consumers bring claims
involving data breaches as federal class action lawsuits, 71 as the number of
potential class members is quite large and the amount of damages that each
individual expects to recover is quite small. 72 Yet, to date, most data breach
class action cases have been dismissed either due to a plaintiff’s inability to
show an injury in fact for purposes of standing or failure to state a claim for
which relief can be granted. 73
The issue of standing has led to a circuit split among the U.S. Courts of
Appeal for the Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuits on one
side and the U.S. Courts of Appeal for the Third, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits
on the other. 74 The circuit split mostly concerns whether data breach victims
have standing to sue an entity with the responsibility of securing PII of customers. 75 Particularly, courts have wrestled with the question of whether a data
breach constitutes an injury in fact and whether a hypothetical risk of future
harm (such as potential identity theft) is sufficient for standing purposes. 76
This split has yet to be resolved by the United States Supreme Court, and the
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

In re SuperValu, 870 F.3d at 774.
Id. at 768.
Id. at 768, 774.
Id. at 774.
FTC enforcement actions are outside the scope of this Note, which focuses on
the Eighth Circuit decisions and the issue of Article III standing.
70. See David J. Baldwin, Jennifer Penberthy Buckley & D. Ryan Slaugh, Insuring Against Privacy Claims Following a Data Breach, 122 PA. ST. L. REV. 683, 687–
706 (2018).
71. Claims are usually brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2018).
72. Megan Dowty, Note, Life Is Short. Go to Court: Establishing Article III Standing in Data Breach Cases, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 683, 686 (2017).
73. See discussion infra Sections III.A, IV.A.
74. See discussion infra Section III.C.
75. See discussion infra Section III.C.
76. See discussion infra Section III.C.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol84/iss1/14

8

Wynhausen: Eighth Circuit Further Complicates

2019] THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT FURTHER COMPLICATES STANDING

305

Court denied a writ of certiorari based on standing in a data breach case in
2018. 77 Section A of this Part discusses the typical elements that plaintiffs in
a data breach case must prove to establish Article III standing. This Section
focuses on the first element of standing: injury in fact. Next, Section B highlights some legal theories plaintiffs have used to substantiate their “injury” after a data breach. Finally, Section C examines, in depth, the circuit split on
standing in data breach cases.

A. Article III Standing
Standing is the major hurdle for plaintiffs to overcome when seeking legal
redress for a data breach. The doctrine of standing limits the categories of
litigants who can seek redress for a legal wrong within a jurisdiction to only
those who have actually suffered injury. 78 For a federal case, which includes
nearly all consumer suits against breached entities, standing is governed by the
Cases and Controversies Clause of Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution. 79 Standing may also be created by Congress specifically by statute as
long as a plaintiff can show he or she suffered concrete harm and not just a
“bare procedural violation” of that statute. 80 The United States Supreme Court
has interpreted standing numerous times, and the most common articulation of
the doctrine came from Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 81 which states that the
“irreducible constitutional minimum” requires plaintiffs to establish that they
“(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of . . . defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” 82
In data breach cases, the first requirement of standing, injury in fact, is
the most difficult for plaintiffs to establish. In fact, for a court to consider the
second and third elements of standing (causality and redressability), an injury
in fact must be found “[f]irst and foremost.” 83 Courts rarely address the second
two elements of standing because injury in fact has been so difficult for plaintiffs to prove. 84 However, when a court has found injury in fact, showing that
the injury is “fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant” is
relatively straightforward. 85 The final element, “redressability,” has been a

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

CareFirst, Inc. v. Attias, 138 S. Ct. 981, 981 (2018) (mem.).
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547–48 (2016).
Id. at 1550.
See id. at 1549–50.
504 U.S. 555 (1992).
Kuhns v. Scottrade, Inc., 868 F.3d 711, 716 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting Spokeo,
136 S. Ct. at 1547).
83. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547 (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env’t, 523
U.S. 83, 103 (1998)).
84. See Dowty, supra note 72, at 695.
85. See id. at 694.
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challenge for plaintiffs in a handful of cases because the nature of the harm is
often abstract. 86
To prove an injury in fact, the United States Supreme Court has stated
that plaintiffs must show “‘an invasion of a legally protected interest’ that is
‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’” 87 In data breach cases, both the “concrete and particularized” and
the “actual or imminent” requirements have been difficult to overcome because
most plaintiffs cannot show that the breach of their PII caused any tangible
harm. 88

1. “Concrete and Particularized”
An injury is “particularized” when it “affect[s] the plaintiff in a personal
and individual way.” 89 In terms of a data breach, each plaintiff’s “personal
interests” in the mishandling of their PII is “individualized rather than collective.” 90 However, particularization alone does not establish an injury in fact;
rather, the “concreteness” of an injury must also be established. 91 For an injury
to be “concrete,” it must “actually exist,” meaning it must be “real[] and not
abstract.” 92 This does not necessarily mean that the injury must be “tangible,”
as intangible harms can constitute a real harm. 93 The United States Supreme
Court has recently noted that a “risk of real harm,” which is clearly intangible,
can satisfy the concreteness element. 94 For a data breach, in which the primary
risk of harm is identity theft, “[n]obody doubts that identity theft, should it
befall one of these plaintiffs, would constitute a concrete and particularized
injury.” 95

86. See id. at 695.
87. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548 (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,

560 (1992)).
88. See, e.g., Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 696 (7th Cir.
2015); Katz v. Pershing, LLC, 672 F.3d 64, 80 (1st Cir. 2012); Reilly v. Ceridian Corp.,
664 F.3d 38, 43 (3d Cir. 2011); Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1142 (9th
Cir. 2010).
89. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1549.
94. Id.; see also Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 153–55
(2010) (stating that a “substantial risk” of cross-contamination of crops was sufficient
injury to find standing).
95. Attias v. CareFirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 627 (D.C. Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138
S. Ct. 981 (2018) (mem.).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol84/iss1/14

10

Wynhausen: Eighth Circuit Further Complicates

2019] THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT FURTHER COMPLICATES STANDING

307

2. “Actual or Imminent”
The United States Supreme Court recently examined the requirement of
imminence in Clapper v. Amnesty International USA. 96 Without reaching the
merits of plaintiff’s argument, the Court held that Article III standing was unavailable for a lack of imminence. 97 The Court admitted that a threat of a “future injury” could be enough to confer Article III standing but only if it is “certainly impending.” 98 However, if the future injury is “speculative” and based
on a “highly attenuated chain of possibilities,” then it cannot be characterized
as “imminent.” 99 Finding standing in data breach cases has become a more
challenging hurdle since Clapper because the risk of harm from a data breach
is often based only on potential identity thefts – an event that has not yet occurred and may not ever occur.

B. Legal Theories on Which Plaintiffs Have Relied
Consumers affected by a data breach attempted to use many theories in
courts to seek remedy for the “harm” of PII exposure. In the past few years
alone, plaintiffs have brought suits for “negligence, breach of contract, unjust
enrichment, breach of fiduciary duty, unfair and deceptive business practices,
invasion of privacy,” and violations of various state and federal statutes. 100
Even when plaintiffs in data breach cases successfully establish standing, few
claims have resulted in successful relief under common law principles. 101
Courts have been rather consistent in finding that the mere risk of future harm
from a data security breach does not rise to the level of compensable harm. 102
96. 568 U.S. 398 (2013).
97. Id. at 422. In Clapper, plaintiffs were a group of non-profit, legal, and media

organizations who argued that § 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act was
unconstitutional because it allowed the government wide berth to eavesdrop on their
communications with overseas contacts. Id. at 401, 406. Plaintiffs claimed that there
was an “objectively reasonable likelihood” that their communications would be intercepted “at some point in the future” and that they would have to travel overseas or cease
communicating with those contacts to circumvent the potential surveillance. Id. at 401,
407.
98. Id. at 409.
99. Id. at 410.
100. Dowty, supra note 72, at 686; see also, e.g., Kuhns v. Scottrade, Inc., 868 F.3d
711 (8th Cir. 2017); Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App’x 384 (6th Cir.
2016); Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2015); Resnick
v. AvMed, Inc., 693 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2012); In re Yahoo! Inc. Customer Data Sec.
Breach Litig., No. 16-MD-02752-LHK, 2017 WL 3727318 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2017);
In re Anthem, Inc. Data Breach Litig., 162 F. Supp. 3d 953 (N.D. Cal. 2016); In re
Target Corp. Data Sec. Breach Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1158 (D. Minn. 2014).
101. See Elizabeth T. Isaacs, Comment, Exposure Without Redress: A Proposed
Remedial Tool for the Victims Who Were Set Aside, 67 OKLA. L. REV. 519, 522 (2015).
102. See Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Liability for Risk of Future Identity Theft, 50
A.L.R. 6th 33, § 6, West (database updated weekly).
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Even if damages could be proven, problems exist with proving causation.
Plaintiffs must show that identity theft or other ill-begotten use of PII was
caused by the data breach in question and not by some prior breach or lawful
dissemination of the data. 103

C. The Circuit Split
The U.S. Courts of Appeal for the Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and District of
Columbia Circuits have consistently been the most likely to find standing in
data breach cases. These circuits have allowed victims of a data breach to sue
when PII is merely exposed to hackers and there is not yet evidence of fraudulent credit card charges 104 or the hackers’ understanding of the data they
breached. 105 The Third, Fourth, and (now) Eighth Circuits have applied more
scrutiny to plaintiffs seeking standing in data breach cases. In these circuits,
plaintiffs must do more than merely allege that PII was exposed to hackers.
These circuits have required evidence that the breached data was actually used
to the detriment of the victims or that the breaching party understood the value
of the data and had actual plans to misuse it.

1. Circuits More Likely to Find Standing: Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and
District of Columbia
The Sixth, Seventh, Ninth and District of Columbia Circuits have interpreted standing requirements for plaintiffs affected by a data breach more liberally. First, each circuit has found that PII exposed in a data breach signifies
some future risk of “concrete” harm of identity theft. Second, each circuit has
found that costs incurred by consumers seeking to mitigate that future harm is
not self-inflicted and constitutes either an injury in fact or some measure of
redressable damages. Finally, each circuit has found that the imminence issue
from Clapper does not pose a substantial barrier to the claims of future harm.
The Sixth Circuit recently found standing for customers of an insurance
company that had over 1.1 million records containing PII compromised. 106
The Sixth Circuit analyzed the risk of the future harm standard laid out in Clapper and determined that “[w]here a data breach targets personal information, a
reasonable inference can be drawn that the hackers will use the victims’ data
for . . . fraudulent purposes . . . .” 107 The court further stated that there was “no
need for speculation” when data had been allegedly stolen and was “in the
103. See Isaacs, supra note 101, at 543–44.
104. See, e.g., Lewert v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., 819 F.3d 963, 966–69 (7th

Cir. 2016).
105. See, e.g., In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig.,
996 F. Supp. 2d 942, 962 (S.D. Cal. 2014).
106. Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App’x 384, 385–86 (6th Cir.
2016).
107. Id. at 388.
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hands of ill-intentioned criminals.” 108 Rejecting the argument that credit monitoring costs were “self-inflicted” in anticipation of non-imminent harm, the
court reasoned that the continuing risk of identity theft and the tangible costs
of monitoring financial accounts for unauthorized activity constituted a
harm. 109 The court placed an emphasis on the fact that the insurance company
explicitly suggested that consumers affected by the breach actively monitor
their accounts, which seemed to contravene the company’s argument that the
harm was not “concrete.” 110
The Seventh Circuit recently reaffirmed its liberal theory of standing for
consumers affected by a credit card data breach in Lewert v. P.F. Chang’s
China Bistro, Inc. 111 Two plaintiffs brought suit, one claiming fraudulent
charges had appeared on a debit card shortly after eating at a P.F. Chang’s restaurant and the other claiming he suffered harm by spending time monitoring
his credit report and card statements after the announcement of the breach, although he did not suffer any fraudulent charges. 112 The court found both plaintiffs had standing. 113 The court determined that it was “plausible to infer a
substantial risk of harm from the data breach[] because a primary incentive for
hackers is ‘sooner or later[ ] to make fraudulent charges or assume those consumers’ identities.’” 114 Regarding the immediacy requirement, the court observed that because the breach had already occurred, the risk of identity theft
and fraudulent charges was “sufficiently immediate to justify mitigation efforts.” 115 The court concluded that “time and money spent resolving fraudulent
charges [were] cognizable injuries for Article III standing.” 116
In Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., the Ninth Circuit found standing for
97,000 Starbucks employees whose unencrypted names, addresses, and social
security numbers were stored on a stolen laptop computer. 117 Starbucks sent
notice to the affected employees and offered free credit monitoring services. 118
Despite the fact that none of the employees suffered any financial loss, the
Ninth Circuit held that they suffered an injury in fact because they experienced
“a credible threat of harm” that was “both real and immediate.” 119 The court
held “that [individuals] whose personal information [had] been stolen but not

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id.
Id. at 388–89.
See id. at 389.
819 F.3d 963, 965 (7th Cir. 2016).
Id.
Id. at 970.
Id. at 967 (alteration in original) (quoting Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp.,
LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 2015)).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 967.
117. 628 F.3d 1139, 1140 (9th Cir. 2010).
118. Id. at 1140–41.
119. Id. at 1143.
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misused[] [had] suffered an injury sufficient to confer standing . . . .” 120 Although the Krottner case was decided before Clapper’s apparent narrowing of
the imminence requirement in 2013, the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of California later adhered to Krottner’s reasoning when it found that
an injury in fact occurred simply because hackers breached a system containing
PII and could have accessed the information in In re Sony Gaming Networks
in 2014. 121
In Attias v. CareFirst, Inc., the District of Columbia Circuit held that approximately one million customers of a health insurance company whose PII
was subjected to a breach had plausibly alleged a substantial enough risk of
future injury to create Article III standing. 122 The court stated that “the proper
way to analyze an increased-risk-of-harm claim is to consider the ultimate alleged harm . . . as the concrete and particularized injury and then to determine
whether the increased risk of such harm makes injury to an individual citizen
sufficiently imminent for standing purposes.” 123 Agreeing with plaintiffs that
identity theft constituted a “concrete and particularized injury” and that the nature of the information breached could plausibly create a “substantial risk of
identity fraud,” the court found that plaintiffs satisfied Clapper’s imminence
test. 124 Finally, the court addressed redressability by considering the costs incurred by plaintiffs to “mitigate or avoid [the] harm” of identity theft and found
that any money spent could be reimbursed to make plaintiffs whole. 125

2. Circuits Less Likely to Grant Relief: Third, Fourth, and Eighth
The Third, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits have been more resistant in finding
standing for plaintiffs in a data breach case. The Third and Fourth Circuits, in
particular, have placed significant roadblocks in front of plaintiffs by rejecting
allegations of “hypothetical, future injur[ies]” and finding plaintiffs’ concerns

120. Id. at 1140.
121. See In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 996 F.

Supp. 2d 942, 962 (S.D. Cal. 2014); see also In re Adobe Sys., Inc. Privacy Litig., 66
F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1214–15 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (finding standing when hackers accessed
credit card information despite no allegations of misuse). But see In re Zappos.com,
Inc., 108 F. Supp. 3d 949, 958–59 (D. Nev. 2015) (holding that the immanency requirement was not met because there was no evidence of misuse three years after the breach
and the passage of time showed no “substantial risk” of harm).
122. 865 F.3d 620, 622–23, 626 (D.C. Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 981
(2018) (mem.).
123. Id. at 627 (quoting Food & Water Watch, Inc. v. Vilsack, 808 F.3d 905, 915
(D.C. Cir. 2015)).
124. Id. at 628–29.
125. Id. at 629.
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about potential identity theft to not be “imminent” enough to warrant standing. 126 As described infra, the Eighth Circuit has found standing in limited
circumstances but has rejected plaintiff claims of compensable harm. 127
The leading case in the Third Circuit as of the time this Note was written
is Reilly v. Ceridian Corp. 128 In Reilly, a payment processor that collected
employees PII to issue paychecks for over 1,900 companies suffered a security
breach, but it was unclear if the hacker “read, copied, or understood the
data.” 129 The court held that the allegations of “hypothetical, future injury”
were insufficient to confer standing. 130 Noting that it was pure speculation to
determine if the hacker actually was aware of the data it accessed, if the hacker
intended to commit any future criminal acts with the information, and if the
information itself could be used to the detriment of plaintiffs, the court rejected
any claim of harm. 131 The court further dismissed the notion that “incurred
expenses in anticipation of future harm,” such as spending time, effort, and
money on credit monitoring, were sufficient to confer standing. 132 The court
did not completely close the door to future suits and suggested, in dicta, that if
it could be shown that breached information “[was] actually read, copied, understood, and misused to a plaintiff’s detriment,” standing would be available. 133
The Fourth Circuit likely has the least plaintiff-friendly interpretation of
the standing doctrine in data breach cases, as shown in its comprehensive denial of standing in Beck v. McDonald. 134 In Beck, a laptop from a veteran’s
hospital containing unencrypted PII of 7,400 patients went missing and was
considered stolen. 135 Plaintiffs, Veterans Affairs (“VA”) patients, brought
claims against the Secretary of VA, alleging federal statutory violations 136 and
an increased risk of harm for future identity theft. 137 Plaintiffs also claimed
mitigation costs because they had to “frequently monitor their credit reports,
bank statements, health insurance reports, and other similar information, purchas[e] credit watch services, and [shift] financial accounts.” 138
The Fourth Circuit disagreed with both claims and distinguished the decisions from the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits that had found standing
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

See, e.g., Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 41, 46 (3d Cir. 2011).
See infra Part IV.
664 F.3d at 38.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 42.
Id.
Id. at 46.
Id. at 45.
See 848 F.3d 262 (4th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Beck v. Shulkin, 137 S. Ct.
2307 (2017) (mem.).
135. Id. at 267.
136. Plaintiffs alleged violations of the Privacy Act of 1974 and the Administrative
Procedure Act. Id. at 266.
137. Id. at 266–67.
138. Id. at 267 (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted).
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after a data breach based on factual differences. 139 Analyzing the “imminence”
prong in light of Clapper, the Beck court found plaintiffs’ claims too speculative and attenuated because, in the three years that had passed since the laptop
was stolen, plaintiffs were unable to produce evidence showing that their PII
had been accessed or misused or that they had suffered from identity theft. 140
To find harm of future identity theft, the court said it would have to construct
an “attenuated chain of possibilities,” which the Clapper court expressly rejected. 141 Then, regarding “substantial risk” of future harm, the court rejected
an argument by plaintiffs that thirty-three percent of data breaches result in
victims of identity theft by pointing out that the number was just a “general
statistic” that had little bearing on the unique facts of the case at hand. 142 Further, unlike the other circuits, the court “decline[d] to infer a substantial risk of
harm of future identity theft” because of the VA’s offer to provide credit monitoring services. 143 The court reasoned that making such a ruling may discourage companies subject to a future breach from offering to provide such credit
monitoring services. 144 Finally, the court rejected the mitigation costs argument by stating that “self-imposed harms cannot confer standing.” 145

IV. INSTANT DECISIONS
The two separate Eighth Circuit panels in Kuhns and In re SuperValu each
found limited standing for Plaintiffs but for completely different reasons. Additionally, each panel chose a different path when determining redressability
for Plaintiffs. This Part will first examine the outcome in Kuhns; next, it will
examine In re SuperValu.

A. Kuhns v. Scottrade, Inc.
Citing Eighth Circuit precedent, 146 the court concluded that Kuhns had
standing for his contract-related claims because “he did not receive the full
benefit of his bargain with Scottrade.” 147 The court affirmed that “a party to a
breached contract has a judicially cognizable interest for standing purposes,
regardless of the merits of the breach alleged.” 148 Because a portion of the fees
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. at 273, 276.
Id. at 274–75.
Id. at 275 (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 588 U.S. 398, 410 (2013)).
Id. at 275–76, 276 n.7.
Id. at 276.
Id.
Id. at 276–77.
Carlsen v. GameStop, Inc., 833 F.3d 903, 909 (8th Cir. 2016) (finding that a
company’s privacy policy contained within terms of service created a contractual relationship that was breached when the company shared confidential personal information
with third parties).
147. Kuhns v. Scottrade, Inc., 868 F.3d 711, 716 (8th Cir. 2017).
148. Id. (quoting Carlsen, 833 F.3d at 909).
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for brokerage services were used to meet Scottrade’s “contractual obligations
to provide data management and security,” the breach of those obligations
meant those services were diminished in value. 149 The court held that this was
enough of a “concrete and particularized” allegation of breach of contract to
confer “actual” injury. 150
The Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision in Kuhns de novo
because Scottrade made a successful summary judgment motion on standing. 151 Kuhns alleged that standing existed because he faced “an immediate
and continuing increased risk of identity theft;” incurred mitigation costs; “received Brokerage Agreement services diminished in value” and therefore did
not receive the full benefit of the bargain; suffered harm from the decline in
value of PII; and suffered an invasion of privacy. 152 In determining standing,
the court – somewhat paradoxically – ignored all the claims but the benefit of
the bargain claim. 153
The next question addressed by the court was whether to dismiss the case
for failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted. 154 The court analyzed each of Kuhn’s four claims for relief individually but ultimately rejected
all of them. 155 First, the court considered a claim for breach of express contract. 156 Noting that the complaint neither identified any actual misrepresentations nor “applicable [data security] law and regulation” breached by Scottrade,
the court concluded that Kuhns’ “bare assertions” of a failure to protect customer PII were not plausible enough to allege “actual damage.” 157 The court
also observed that the express terms of the contract did not appear to contemplate data management or security. 158 The court concluded that because no
fraud or identity theft had resulted from stolen PII in the two years since the
breach was identified, it was inappropriate to base massive class action litigation on mere “allegations of worry and inconvenience.” 159
Second, the court dismissed Kuhn’s claim of implied breach of contract
for a failure to allege a plausible claim. 160 Despite the brokerage agreement
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 715. The court noted that Kuhns had filed to voluntarily dismiss the case

after fully briefing the court and prior to oral arguments because of another action on
the matter that was proceeding in California state court; however, the court considered
the motion untimely and proceeded. Id. at 715, 719.
152. Id. at 715.
153. See id. at 716.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 717–19. The four claims were: (1) breach of express contract; (2) breach
of implied contract and unjust enrichment; (3) declaratory relief; and (4) breach of the
MMPA, a consumer protection statute. Id.
156. Id. at 717–18.
157. Id. (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
158. Id. at 718.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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containing language that the company utilized “industry leading” security
measures, the court declined to speculate about whether it implied an additional
contract term because of a lack of any cognizable industry standard. 161 Third,
the court dismissed Kuhn’s claim for declaratory relief that Scottrade “stop its
illegal practices” because it concluded the claim was “virtually unintelligible”
and only “focuse[d] on past conduct . . . not on Scottrade’s current practices.” 162 Finally, the court dismissed Kuhn’s fraud claim under the Missouri
Merchandising Practices Act (“MMPA”) because it found that the statute only
covered fraud in relation to the “sale of merchandise.” 163 Noting that intangible services can qualify as merchandise, the court further determined that Scottrade was selling brokerage services, not data security services, and that any
customers’ transfer of PII was “voluntarily transfer[ed]” to obtain access to
those brokerage services. 164

B. In re SuperValu, Inc.
This case was also reviewed de novo by the Eighth Circuit. 165 The main
question for the court in In re SuperValu was whether Plaintiffs had adequately
alleged a “‘certainly impending’ or ‘substantial risk’ of identity theft as a result
of the data breaches.” 166 The court began by dismissing standing-based arguments from the Sixth, Seventh, and District of Columbia Circuits by claiming
that the facts were distinguishable. 167 It then agreed that the facts supported a
conclusion that the hackers actually stole credit card information from Plaintiffs and had not merely gained access to the data. 168 The court then observed
that only Holmes alleged any fraudulent transactions on a financial account and
that the other Plaintiffs’ allegations rested “on information and belief [that] illicit websites [were] selling their Card Information to counterfeiters and fraudsters.” 169 The court considered these allegations to be too speculative rather
than “certainly impending” and concluded that Plaintiffs failed to show any
injury. 170

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 718–19.
Id. at 719.
In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763, 768 (8th Cir. 2017).
Id. at 769.
See id. The court did not elaborate on the factual differences between the cases
in sister circuits and the case at hand. See id. However, the cases cited by the court
here included instances in which PII was compromised from two separate insurance
databases, a healthcare database, and malware installed on two separate point-of-sale
systems. See id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 769–70.
170. Id.
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After concluding that identity theft “constitutes an actual, concrete, and
particularized injury,” the court next determined whether the mere risk of future identity theft could be considered “substantial.” 171 The court examined
the nature of the data stolen: credit card information. 172 Credit card information typically does not accompany any sensitive PII and “generally cannot
be used alone to open unauthorized new accounts.” 173 Concluding that there
was “little to no risk” that fraudulent accounts could be opened in the name of
Plaintiffs, the court held that the mere theft of the information did not create a
substantial enough risk to constitute injury in fact. 174 The court then went a
step further and addressed the mitigation costs borne by Plaintiffs, holding that
“[b]ecause [P]laintiffs have not alleged a substantial risk of future identity
theft, the time they spent protecting themselves against this speculative threat
cannot create an injury.” 175 Thus, standing was denied for all Plaintiffs who
merely alleged a future risk of harm. 176
For Holmes – the named Plaintiff who alleged present injury – however,
the court was more lenient. Stating that “the misuse of Holmes’ Card Information is credit card fraud and thus a form of identity theft,” the court answered
whether the complaint had alleged sufficient causation to link the breach to the
fraud in the affirmative. 177 Defendants argued that the present harm theory
should be dismissed because it had not been argued in the complaint. 178 However, the court noted that “it is unnecessary to set out a legal theory for . . .
[P]laintiff’s claim for relief in a pleading” so long as the alleged facts demonstrate actual injury. 179 The court then analyzed four elements to determine potential causation: (1) Defendants failed to secure the data on their network, (2)
the network was subsequently hacked, (3) the data was stolen by hackers, and
(4) Holmes became a victim of identity theft after the breaches. 180 The court
stated that Holmes met his “modest” burden of alleging that the fraudulent
charge was “fairly traceable” to Defendants’ breach. 181
Defendants next argued that even if Holmes had alleged standing for a
present injury, his allegation was insufficient to provide standing for the rest of

171. Id. at 770.
172. Id. at 770–71.
173. Id. at 770 (quoting U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-07-737,

PERSONAL INFORMATION: DATA BREACHES ARE FREQUENT, BUT EVIDENCE OF
RESULTING IDENTITY THEFT IS LIMITED; HOWEVER, THE FULL EXTENT IS UNKNOWN 30
(2007)). To be classified as PII, the data would have to be similar to “social security
numbers, birth dates, and driver’s license numbers.” See id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 771.
176. Id. at 771–72.
177. Id. at 772–73.
178. Id. at 772.
179. Id. (quoting Johnson v. City of Shelby, 135 S. Ct. 346, 347 (2014)).
180. Id.
181. Id.
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the class, who had only alleged risk of future harm without evidence of “widespread misuse.” 182 The court held that each class member’s standing must be
“assessed individually” and that it was error to make Holmes’ standing dependent on the standing of other named and unnamed Plaintiffs. 183 The court stated,
“To the extent Holmes can show that the fraudulent charge was unreimbursed,
such financial harm would be compensable in this action.” 184 Thus, this panel
of the Eighth Circuit forged its own path in the circuit split by finding standing
for a present injury while rejecting any claim for potential future injury even
though Plaintiffs had incurred mitigation costs in response to the breach. 185

V. COMMENT
This Part proceeds in three Sections. Section A discusses the contributions of Kuhns and In re SuperValu to current law in data breach cases. Section
B discusses what plaintiffs filing a case in the Eighth Circuit should consider
before bringing a data breach case. Finally, Section C concludes with thoughts
on expected changes in the law regarding data breach litigation.

A. The State of the Law After Kuhns and In re SuperValu
The Eighth Circuit’s contribution to the panoply of law surrounding data
breaches is further proof that the United States Supreme Court needs to revisit
its voluminous Article III standing jurisprudence and articulate a new doctrine
for the digital age. The series of decisions since Lujan have only further obscured the meaning of injury in fact. The divergent course of the circuits provides clear evidence of this confusion. For instance, some circuits have no
problem finding harm from mitigation costs borne by plaintiffs when a data
breach occurs, while others consider such costs to be a self-imposed harm. 186
Some circuits agree that the risk of future harm from compromised PII is sufficient to find standing, while others believe it is too speculative. 187
The Eighth Circuit’s decisions are curious because the court found standing but ultimately rejected both mitigation costs and risk of future harm as injuries. 188 Therefore, it effectively shut the door on any recovery for plaintiffs
unless they can prove actual identity theft. Tracing identity theft to a particular
breach is a problem in itself, particularly as more and more sources containing
sensitive PII are breached. Restricting plaintiff recovery to actual, traceable

182. Id. at 772–73. The district court had accepted this argument in its opinion for
dismissal. Id. at 773.
183. Id. at 773.
184. Id.
185. See id. at 774.
186. See supra Section III.C.
187. See supra Section III.C.
188. See supra Part IV.
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identity theft may make it nearly impossible for Eighth Circuit plaintiffs to obtain standing if their data is subject to breach. This will likely reduce the number of cases brought in the Eighth Circuit, as putative plaintiffs will likely seek
the more favorable jurisdictions of the Sixth and Seventh Circuits.
The Kuhns decision is particularly vexing. The court found standing on
a contract theory but then rejected any compensable harm for breach of that
contract. 189 Nearly every online service contains some sort of privacy policy
that could be interpreted as forming an implied contract. If any payment is
made for those services, then customers whose data is breached lose the “benefit of the bargain” in the form of diminished value for those services. By
dismissing Kuhns’ claims for failure to state a claim for which relief could be
granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the bar set for
plaintiffs was raised even higher.
After Kuhns, plaintiffs who paid a service fee with an associated privacy
policy will likely be found to have standing in the event of a breach but will
still be ineligible for any recovery based on any risk of future harm. Parties
that have been subject to a data breach need only to take steps to mitigate future
harm, such as notifying its customers or providing credit monitoring services,
to reduce their potential liability. These mitigation steps may keep the problem
from worsening, but these steps do not put customers in the same position that
they were before the breach occurred, and the breach of contract would go
without remedy.
The United States Supreme Court denied writ of certiorari in Attias v.
CareFirst, Inc., 190 leaving the decisions in both Kuhns and In re SuperValu as
the most recent statement on data breach jurisprudence in the Eighth Circuit as
of the time this Note was written. The two decisions tilt the weight of the
majority of circuits in favor of finding no compensable relief for risk of future
harm when a breach occurs. 191 Most circuits seem content to follow their own
precedents at the moment. 192 Until the Court grants a writ of certiorari in a
data breach case, Congress takes action to address the issue, or the FTC engages in significant rulemaking, few major changes can be expected in data
breach jurisprudence.

B. Considerations When Bringing Data Breach Suits in the Eighth Circuit
Lawyers representing plaintiffs who seek standing and recovery for a data
breach action should make sure to follow a few basic principles. First, they
should make sure that plaintiffs have a credible allegation of identity theft that
is somehow traceable to the data breach. The record is littered with dismissed

189.
190.
191.
192.

See supra Section IV.A.
865 F.3d 620 (D.C. Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 981 (2018) (mem.).
See supra Section III.C.
See supra Section III.C.
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cases because plaintiffs could only claim some speculative future harm. 193 Allegations of identity theft not only are important for finding standing but are
also likely needed for any chance of damage recovery. 194 The decisions in
Kuhns and In re SuperValu have shown that the mere risk of identity theft is
not enough.
Second, other forms of relief may be available – i.e., prospective relief,
such as credit monitoring or an injunction mandating security improvements. 195 A settlement that includes injunctive relief may have greater value
than a settlement granting relief in the form of identity theft damages alone. 196
Third, it is important to consider other parties that may have some share in the
liability, such as third-party vendors. 197 If another party has a share of the responsibility for the breach, it may increase the pressure on defendants to reach
a settlement, as one party would no longer bear the brunt of any damages. 198
Finally, attorneys should consider both common law and statutory claims, as
many states have created a private cause of action for litigants in the event of
a breach of PII. 199 While the odds are stacked against recovery of actual pecuniary damages for plaintiffs in the Eighth Circuit, some courts have been willing to grant some varieties of relief, 200 and settlement options may make it
worth an attorney’s time.

C. Inching Towards a Solution
As long as the bulk of consumer claims against breached entities fail, little
incentive exists for institutional changes in data management policies to be
made. Parties holding PII may be aware that improper stewardship of data may
bring about FTC enforcement, but limited agency resources can only focus on
the most egregious violators. 201 Yet, as the risks of data breaches become more
193. See, e.g., Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 271–72 (4th Cir.), cert. denied sub
nom. Beck v. Shulkin, 137 S. Ct. 2307 (2017) (mem.); Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664
F.3d 38, 42 (3d Cir. 2011).
194. See Aaron Blumenthal & Andre M. Mura, In the Breach, TRIAL, Sept. 2017,
at 30, 31–32.
195. Id. at 32.
196. For instance, settlements with Adobe and Target after a data breach derived
nearly all value from injunctive mandates, such as regular auditing, system monitoring,
and employee security training. Id. at 32. For attorneys litigating a case, this value
becomes calculated in the eventual costs billed to the losing party.
197. Id. at 32–33.
198. Id. at 33.
199. At least thirteen states have passed legislation requiring certain standards for
how private data stewards can manage to collect data about residents. For a list of these
statutes, see Data Security Laws: Private Sector, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES (Oct. 15, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunicationsand-information-technology/data-security-laws.aspx.
200. See Blumenthal & Mura, supra note 194, at 32–33.
201. See Baldwin, Buckley, & Slaugh, supra note 70, at 703–05.
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public, and when a major settlement or judgment is rendered against a data
steward, there will likely be a rapid shift towards self-regulation within the
industry.
Holders of PII will need a clear understanding of exactly what is being
collected, how it is being stored, and what security measures are being employed. Data minimization strategies 202 will be more likely employed, and PII
that may induce monetary liability might be encrypted or deleted in order to
avoid potential liability. Emerging technologies, such as encrypted signatures,
may have to replace a social security number, date-of-birth, mother’s maiden
name, and driver’s license number as a means of verification. Also, because
of decisions like Kuhns, privacy policies and promises made to consumers will
likely be changed to avoid giving plaintiffs a potential cause of action.
Some commenters have argued for the creation of a negligence cause of
action called the “negligent enablement of cybercrime,” which could be directed at entities who produce “defective products and services that pave the
way for third party cybercriminals who exploit known vulnerabilities.” 203 This
new cause of action would create “a modified duty of care on the part of software licensors to incorporate reasonable security into their products and services.” 204 These commentators suggest the new tort would likely need to be
created by statute and would need to be based on existing principles of warranties, premises liability, and negligence-based products liability from the Uniform Commercial Code. 205 The development of a new standard would not be
easy, but there are examples of successful implementation of similar standards
in the Payment Card Industry (“PCI”). 206 Lessons could be drawn from this
relatively recent, successful implementation of a new standard that was implemented by industry actors instead of by government fiat. 207 It is clear, however, that the existing causes of action are insufficient for granting relief to
those harmed by a data breach.
202. Data minimization is the process of removing or destroying unnecessary data
from vulnerable locations. Sona R. Makker, Overcoming “Foggy” Notions of Privacy:
How Data Minimization Will Enable Privacy in the Internet of Things, 85 UMKC L.
REV. 895, 903 (2017).
203. Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, The Tort of Negligent Enablement
of Cybercrime, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1553, 1553 (2005).
204. Id. at 1557.
205. Id. at 1558, 1594. Premises liability is built on the idea that those who are
aware of dangerous conditions upon their premises and take no immediate steps to fix
the conditions are liable for the consequences. Id. at 1581–82. In terms of software,
this would mean failure to patch known vulnerabilities in defective code. Id. at 1582.
206. The standard is called Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (“PCI
DDS”) and was “developed to encourage and enhance cardholder data security and
facilitate the broad adoption of consistent data security measures globally.” John A.
Fisher, Note, Secure My Data or Pay the Price: Consumer Remedy for the Negligent
Enablement of Data Breach, 4 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 215, 226 (2013).
207. For instance, the development of the PCI standards came through a collaborative effort between the major payment card companies and is governed by representatives from each participating member. See About Us, PCI SEC. STANDARDS COUNCIL,
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The issue has remained at the forefront of the national conversation. In
November 2018, Senator Ron Wyden of Oregon announced draft legislation
that would “empower consumers to control their personal information, create
radical transparency into how corporations use and share their data, and impose
harsh fines and prison terms for executives at corporations that misuse Americans’ data.” 208 The bill, titled the “Consumer Data Protection Act,” 209 proposed to strengthen the authority of the FTC, giving it broad new powers to be
“an effective cop on the beat.” 210 The draft language would empower the FTC
to establish minimum privacy and cybersecurity standards, issue steep fines
and criminal penalties when those standards are broken, create a national “Do
Not Track” system that allows consumers to restrict what third party companies
can do with PII, give consumers a system to review which companies have
their PII and how it is used, and require companies that have consumer PII to
review how that data is managed. 211
Senator Wyden’s draft bill is ambitious, but it stands little chance of becoming law as it is written. Current political headwinds blow against an expansion of the administrative state. Not to mention the scope of the proposed
sanctions for certain data breaches is troubling. 212 Also, it would take many
years for the FTC to build out its enforcement mechanisms, during which time
the provisions of the bill would likely be under constant challenge in federal
court. The case law surrounding data breaches makes it clear that the judiciary
will not be arriving at a unified solution unless the United States Supreme Court
finally grants certiorari in a data breach case. Senator Wyden’s bill (and other
federal bills like it) 213 are necessary parts of the puzzle. A proposed legislative
fix stakes out the parameters of the problem and signals to both companies that
hold consumer PII and to the public at large that the status quo is untenable.
https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/about_us/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2019). While the
number of entities that control or manage potentially sensitive consumer PII is far larger
than the limited number of payment card processors, the PCI model shows that collaborative efforts among stakeholders can be effective at creating a self-regulatory environment.
208. Press Release, Ron Wyden, Wyden Releases Discussion Draft of Legislation
to Provide Real Protections for Americans’ Privacy (Nov. 1, 2018), https://www.wyden.senate.gov/news/press-releases/wyden-releases-discussion-draft-of-legislation-toprovide-real-protections-for-americans-privacy.
209. S. 2188, 115th Cong. (2017).
210. Wyden, supra note 208.
211. Id.
212. For instance, the bill considers the imposition of penalties of up to four percent
of annual revenue for a company who breaches the standards on the first offense alone.
Id. The law would also sanction criminal penalties for senior executives of up to twenty
years. Id.
213. Data privacy bills are regularly introduced in both Houses of Congress, but
they rarely (if ever) escape from the committee process. See, e.g., American Data Dissemination Act of 2019, S. 142, 116th Cong. §1 (2019); Data Care Act of 2018, S.
3744, 115th Cong. §2 (2018); Cyber Privacy Fortification Act of 2015, H.R. 104, 114th
Cong. §1 (2015).
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The failure of Congress to pass any of the comprehensive data privacy bills
proposed in the past few years does not bode well for Senator Wyden’s current
iteration, but with each subsequent mass data breach, the pressure for Congress
to act rises.
A better solution would take a page from the promulgation of the PCI
standards. Industry leaders should work together to establish what the standards for security of consumer PII should be in each sector. Instead of relying
on the FTC to create a new standard out of whole cloth, as proposed in the
Wyden bill, Congress should work with stakeholders to develop standards for
the collection and management of consumer PII so that enforcement is not so
reliant on FTC action. A statute that clearly spells out when the victim of a
data breach has standing to pursue a private right of action would give the FTC
some improved tools for enforcement against entities that refuse to adhere to
the industry defined standards, set commonsense penalties for those who negligently allow data breaches to occur, and acknowledge that the difficulties of
complete data protection would be a more complete effort. Relying solely
upon the courts to solve the mess caused by the thousands of data breaches that
occur each year will not yield a workable solution for quite some time.

VI. CONCLUSION
The current state of the law regarding data breaches is, quite frankly, all
over the place – as evidenced by the enormous volume of cases concerning the
matter. Organizations that suffer a breach may be liable to the FTC, state governments, and consumers in private actions. 214 This uncertainty is enormously
inefficient and frustrating for plaintiffs’ attorneys who may wish to pursue a
case. Consumers have used a scattershot of legal actions to seek redress and
have largely come up empty. 215 The results in Kuhns and In re SuperValu
provide further examples of this chaos. 216 Few changes to the legal framework
appear to be on the horizon unless Congress takes action, the FTC engages in
significant regulatory rulemaking, or the United States Supreme Court agrees
to take a case on the matter. The value of a person’s PII diminishes each time
a major breach occurs, and eventually, the market may simply have to develop
better methods of verifying identity. Privacy of PII, at least as it has come to
be understood, appears to have become a casualty of the digital age; and the
truth is, if private information is put online, someone will try to steal it.

214. See supra Part III.
215. See supra Section III.B.
216. See supra Part IV.
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